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The present paper develops a theoretical model of labor supply with domestic production. It 
is shown that the structural components of the model can be identified without a distribution 
factor, thereby generalizing the initial results of Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997). 
The theoretical model is then estimated using the ATUS data. The empirical results are 
compared to those obtained from a similar model without domestic production. 
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In labor supply analysis, the traditional approach describes household behavior as
resulting from the decisions of a single individual, not considering the fact that most
households are composed of several persons who take part in the decision process.
Nevertheless, during the last two decades, several authors have aimed at explicitly
introducing individualistic elements in models of household behavior. In particu-
lar, the collective model of labour supply, developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), has
turned out to be very attractive. In his original framework, Chiappori represents the
household as a collectivity consisting of two persons, each of them being character-
ized by a speci￿c utility function, that make Pareto-e¢ cient decisions. The empirical
consequences of the e¢ ciency assumption are then analyzed in a household labor
supply model, in which only total consumption and individual labor supplies are
observable by the outside econometrician. Chiappori shows that, if preferences are
of the egoistic type and consumption is purely private, the rule that describes how
household resources are shared between spouses can be identi￿ed (up to a constant)
from the sole estimation of spouses￿labor supply functions. Furthermore, Chiap-
pori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) introduces the notion of distribution factors, de￿ned
as variables that in￿ uence the sharing of resources within the household without af-
fecting preferences or the budget constraint, and thereby complete the preceding
identi￿cation result.1
The initial formulation of the collective model of labor supply ￿what we call Chi-
appori￿ s (1992) model henceforth ￿is based on the strong hypothesis that all non-
market time coincides with leisure. In other words, the possibility of time spent in
home production activities is simply ignored. Apps and Rees (1996, 1997) rightly
point out that, in that case, a low level of market labor supply is automatically
interpreted as greater consumption of leisure, whereas it may in fact re￿ ects the
specialization of one of the members in home production. These authors conclude
that the presence of homework may signi￿cantly distort welfare analysis based on
Chiappori￿ s (1992) identi￿cation results. Going one step further, Donni (2008) shows
that welfare analysis will be unbiased only in the case where the domestic produc-
tion function is additively separable in spouses￿time inputs, that is, the case where
the time devoted to domestic chores by each spouse is independent of the wage rate
1See Chiappori and Donni (2010) for a recent survey of the collective model literature.
2of her/his partner. Yet this result is essentially theoretical. It says nothing on the
actual size of the distortions, due to the omission of domestic production, in welfare
analysis that are carried out with real data.
The collective model of labor supply has, however, been extended to household
production. In particular, Chiappori (1997) considers a generalization of his initial
model where consumption goods can be purchased on the market or produced from
a technology using spouses￿time input. This is what we refer to as Chiappori￿ s
(1997) model henceforth. He then shows that, in the case of marketable domestic
production, and if there is at least one distribution factor, the sharing rule can be
completely identi￿ed (up to a constant) from the estimation of market and domestic
labor supply functions.2 One of the very rare estimations of this model is proposed
by Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2010) with French data.3 These authors concentrate
on a sample of couples where both spouses are working and estimate a system of
total labor supply functions (de￿ned as the sum of domestic and market labor supply
functions).4 They then recover the parameters of the sharing rule.
In the present paper, we consider the collective model of labor supply with (mar-
ketable) domestic production. Our objectives are threefold.
Firstly, we will prove a new identi￿cation result for the collective model of labor
supply with marketable domestic production for the case where no distribution factor
is observable. More precisely, we will show that, even in that case, the sharing rule
can be retrieved provided a complete system of domestic and market labor supply
functions is estimated. This theoretical result, as simple as it may be, is original
and important because ￿nding (exogenous) distribution factors is always a di¢ cult
task for the econometrician. In addition, this new identi￿cation result will allow
2The marketability (or complete market) assumption, though restrictive, is essential to guar-
antee the identi￿cation of the structural components of the model. Even in the unitary approach,
the model of domestic production developed by Gronau (1977, 1980) and its numerous extensions
(Graham and Green, 1984; Solberg and Wong, 1992) cannot avoid using this very assumption to
disentangle utility functions and production functions from observed household behavior.
3Estimations of variations of this model are also given by Apps and Rees (1996, Australia);
Aronsson, Daunfeldt and Wikstrom (2001, Sweden); Couprie (2007, United Kingdom).
4The theory of collective models with domestic production, up to now, does not deal with the
spouses￿decision to participate in the labor market. Regarding the case without domestic produc-
tion, see Donni (2003, 2007) for a theoretical and empirical study of the decision to participate.
3us to underline the close relationship between the initial model of Chiappori (1992)
and its generalized version with domestic production.
Secondly, we will present estimations of the sharing rule using data from the Amer-
ican Time Use Survey (ATUS). Our theoretical model is basically the same as that
of Chiappori (1997). The method of estimation, however, is quite di⁄erent from
that of Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2010). The ￿rst divergence is that a complete
system of market and domestic labor supply equations is estimated, and not only
total labor supply equations. This is necessary because distribution factors are not
used here for identifying the structural components of the model. The second diver-
gence is that the selection of working couples on which estimations are performed is
modelled using the Heckman method. In addition, the ATUS data are particularly
well adapted to our purpose, for at least two reasons: (i) the labor market is much
more ￿ exible in the US than in France so that market working time contains a lot of
information on household decision process that can be exploited by the econometri-
cian, (ii) the number of households questioned in the ATUS is considerable so that
estimations can be performed on a very large, well-calibrated sample of couples.
Thirdly, we will systematically study the distortions generated by the omission of
domestic production from an empirical perspective. To do so, the functional form
for market labor supply we use is consistent with Chiappori￿ s (1992) model as well
as with Chiappori￿ s (1997) model. Our results then connect the discrepancies that
may exist between the structural estimates of these two models to the properties of
the domestic labor supply functions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the collective model of
labor supply with and without domestic production in the absence of distribution
factors. In section 3, we present the empirical speci￿cation of our model. In section
4, we discuss the data used and the estimation method. In section 5, we report
estimation results and, in section 6, we conclude.
2 The Collective Model of Labor Supply
In what follows, we will focus on a two-person household that makes decisions about
consumption and leisure, and we adopt two fundamental assumptions. (i) Each
household member is characterized by a speci￿c, egoistic utility function that de-
pends on consumption of good Ci and leisure T ￿ Li, where T denotes total time
4endowment and Li denotes individual i￿total labor supply (i.e., the sum of domestic
labor supply ti and market labor supply hi), with i = 1;2.5 The utility is represented





where d is a vector of socio-demographic factors that may a⁄ect individual prefer-
ences.6 As a convention, we also suppose that individual 1 is the ￿husband" and
individual 2 the ￿wife". (ii) The outcome of the decision process is Pareto optimal,
that is, at the equilibrium, it is not possible increase the welfare of one household
member without decreasing the welfare of the other household member.
This con￿guration de￿nes the so-called collective approach. This approach can be
legitimized referring to the theory of repeated games under perfect information.
Since the household is a typical example of such repeated games, it is plausible that
e¢ cient decision process could be developed by its members. We will then consider
two variations of the collective model of labour supply, namely, Chiappori (1992)￿ s
model without domestic production and Chiappori (1997)￿ s model with domestic
production.
2.1 The model without household production
If there is no domestic production, total labor supply Li coincides with market labor
supply hi. Moreover, all the consumption of household members is purchased on






where Li denotes here individual i￿(market) labor supply, wi are individual wage
rates and y is non-labor income (or net expenditure). Chiappori (1992) shows that,
given the assumptions of e¢ ciency and egoistic preferences, the household decision
program can be reduced to a two-stage decision process. At the ￿rst stage, non
labor income y is shared among household members according to a sharing rule.
At the second stage, each individual separately allocates her/his income to own
consumption and leisure in a way that maximize her/his own utility subject to an
individual budget constraint. Formally, the result is stated as follows.
5As explained by Chiappori (1992), all the results that follow still hold in the case of caring
(not paternalistic) preferences.
6To simplify notation, we suppose that these factors are the same for both spouses.
5Lemma 1. The Pareto optimal allocations (Ci;Li) are solution of the following
decentralized programs: each household member maximizes her/his utility subject












for some functions ￿i(w1;w2;y;d) such that
P
i ￿i(y;w1;w2;d) = y. Individual





for some Marshallian labor supply functions F i.
Proof. This sharing rule interpretation derives directly from an application of the
second fundamental theorem of welfare economics; see also Chiappori (1992). ￿
In principle, the sharing rule ￿i(w1;w2;y;d) may also depend on additional vari-
ables, distinct from socio-demographic factors, that are called ￿distribution factors￿ .
For instance, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) and Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz
(2010) use the sex ratio in the surrounding population as argument of the sharing
rule. The intuition is that a change in the respective number of male and female
potential partners in the marriage market may modify the balance of power in the
household (Becker, 1993). The existence of distribution factors makes identi￿cation
easier. To be valid, however, distribution factors must be excluded from the argu-
ments of the utility functions, which is a restrictive assumption. If this exclusion
does not hold, identi￿cation of the sharing rule may well be biased. In what fol-
lows we thus decided to start from the assumption that the econometrician does not
observe distribution factor, and to examine identi￿cation issues in this very case.
The previous lemma has two consequences. From equation (2), let us note, that in-
dividual i￿ s wage rate has only an income e⁄ect on member j￿ s labor supply through
the individuals￿ s share of non labor income. This property is restrictive and can
be empirically tested for su¢ ciently ￿ exible functional forms; see Chiappori (1988,
1992). In addition, the sharing rule can be generically identi￿ed from the estima-
tion of the market labor supply functions. For the sake of completeness, we will now
6present this well-known result. First of all, to make explicit the regularity conditions


















so that we can de￿ne:
￿ =
ABy ￿ Bw2
Aw1 + ABy ￿ Bw2 ￿ AyB
; and ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿):
provided that
Aw1 + ABy 6= AyB ￿ Bw2: (R￿ 2)
The identi￿cation result of Chiappori (1992) is formally given below.
Proposition 2. Under conditions (R￿ 1) and (R￿ 2), the individual shares are iden-
ti￿ed up to one additive function of socio-demographic factors from the estimation
of market labor supply functions. In particular the partial derivatives of individual
1￿ s share of income are given by
￿
1
y = ￿; ￿
1
w2 = A￿; and ￿
1
w1 = ￿B￿;
and those of individual 2￿ s share by
￿
2
y = ￿; ￿
2
w2 = ￿A￿; and ￿
2
w1 = B￿:
Proof. See Chiappori (1992). ￿
The basic idea of this result can be explained as follows. Changes either in non-labor
income or in the spouses￿wage rate can have only an income e⁄ect; speci￿cally, they
will a⁄ect the member￿ s behavior only insofar as her share of nonlabor income is
modi￿ed. Hence any simultaneous change in non-labor income and spouse i￿ s wage
rate that leaves unchanged spouse j￿ s labor supply must keep constant j￿ s share
as well. From this idea, it is possible to derive the indi⁄erence surfaces of this
share in the space (wi;y). Since both shares add up to one, the sharing rule itself
can actually be recovered up to a function of socio-demographic factors. From the
knowledge of the individual budget constraints, the individual utility functions can
then be recovered (up to the function at stake).
72.2 The model with household production
From now on we consider the collective model of labor supply with domestic pro-
duction. First of all we suppose that household members share their time between






Moreover, we follow Gronau (1977, 1980) and suppose that the domestic good can
be exchanged on a competitive market at a constant price. In other words, total
consumption of individual i can be divided between consumption purchased on the
market and consumption produced within the household. The quantity of purchased
goods is denoted by xi and the quantity of produced goods by zi. Hence total












where the technology is supposed to depend on the vector of socio-demographic
factors. Thanks to the marketability assumption, the spouses￿decisions regarding
production and consumption can be seen as sequential, that is, the household ￿rst
solves its production problem and maximize household pro￿t, and then allocates
non-labor income and the pro￿t obtained from the ￿rst stage to consumption: each
member maximizes separately her/his own welfare under her/his own budget and
time constraints. This result is formally presented below.
Lemma 3. The Pareto optimal allocations (ti;Ci;Li) are solution of the following
decentralized programs:
A. At the ￿rst stage, the optimal allocation of time to household production is















B. At the second stage, each household member maximizes her/his utility subject












for some functions ￿i(y;w1;w2;d), such that
P
i ￿i(y;w1;w2;d) = y + ￿(w1;






for some Marshallian labor supply functions F i(￿):
Proof. This result is also a straightforward implication of the second theorem of
welfare economics in an economy with production; see also Chiappori (1997). ￿
Our new theoretical result here is that the sharing rule up can be identi￿ed up to













































￿ = 1 ￿ ￿
￿:
The identi￿cation result is then as follows.
9Proposition 4. Under conditions (R￿ 10) and (R￿ 20), the individual shares are
identi￿ed up to two functions of socio-demographic variables (one for each individ-
ual share) from the estimation of market and domestic labor supply functions. In




























Proof. See Appendix. ￿
The intuition is basically the same as that of the previous identi￿cation result, not-
ing that the pro￿t function entering total labor supply functions can be recovered,
using the Hotelling lemma, from the integration of domestic labor supply func-
tions. However, the number of unidenti￿ed functions is equal to two here (instead
of one in the preceding proposition) because the pro￿t function itself is de￿ned up
to a function of socio-demographic factors. Once these functions are picked up, the
individual preferences can be uniquely recovered. Note also that identi￿cation in the
proposition above requires the estimation of both market and domestic labor supply
functions. In contrast, Chiappori (1997) and Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2010) in a
collective model with distribution factors show that the sharing rule can be retrieved
from the estimation of the sole total labor supply functions.
2.3 Robustness of the results: incomplete markets and joint
consumption
One of the key assumptions here is that home time produces a good that has a
perfect (or close at least) substitute sold on the market at a constant price. In that
case, the price of the domestic good is exogenously ￿xed by the market and the
household members devote their time to domestic production up to the point at
which marginal productivity equals the ratio of the wage to the price of the good.
This assumption does not pose any important di¢ culty for farm households with a
signi￿cant activity in agricultural production. In the agricultural economics litera-
ture, the idea that households are price-takers for every good (including domestic
production) is generally accepted by economists. One reservation, however, is that
10the buying price of the domestic good may well be larger than the selling price be-
cause of taxes and transaction costs. Formally, let us suppose that the price of the
domestic good at the margin is equal to one if the household is a net seller and to
p > 1 if the household is a net buyer. Hence, for some subset of exogenous variables
such that there is no transaction on the market, the price of the domestic good
will be endogenously determined and comprised between one and the buying price
p. Technically, the framework with complete market presented here is not valid in
that very case. However, the subset of exogenous variables in question may often
be neglected in empirical applications.
The area of application of the present model is certainly not restricted to the study
of agricultural production, though. The marketability assumption can also be used
to describe the behavior of urban households. For instance, the labor supply model
developed by Gronau (1977) is based on the idea that the same goods and services
(such as cleaning or catering) can be produced at home or bought on outside markets
at a given price. This is exactly our claim here. Of course, the goods produced
within the household are, in general, not perfectly substitutable with those traded
on the market. If so, the price of the domestic good is endogenously determined
within the household and enters, as an additional argument, the total labor supply
functions and the pro￿t function. Even in that case, however, the marketability
assumption can still be seen as a useful approximation because it makes possible
to derive strong identi￿cation results. This approximation is well-founded if the
marginal rate of substitution between the goods produced within the household and
the goods purchased on the market is almost constant.
The assumption that household consumption is purely private, on the other hand,
is restrictive as well, and deserves to be examined. If consumption is public, the
price of the consumption good will be speci￿c to individuals living in the household
and/or endogenously determined. Our claim here is that the collective model of
labor supply with private consumption is a good approximation of a more general
model with public consumption provided that the shadow price of consumption is
not excessively ￿ exible. To take a simple example, let us suppose that the con-
sumption good has a public and a private element. The fraction of the good that is
publicly consumed by both spouses is the same and equal to ￿, while the fraction
that is privately consumed is equal to 1 ￿ ￿. If so, one unit of the (purchased or
produced) good will generate a total consumption for both spouses equal to 1 + ￿
11and the shadow price of consumption will be equal to 1=(1+￿). This shadow price
enters, as an additional argument, the total labor supply functions and the pro￿t
function (without precluding the marketability assumption, though). If ￿ is con-
stant, however, the shadow price can be omitted of the analysis and the framework
with private consumption presented here is still valid.7
3 Functional Form and Stochastic Speci￿cation
3.1 The reduced-form model
Our strategy is to choose a functional form for the reduced-form model and to derive
the structural parameters from it. To evaluate the role of domestic production, the
reduced-form model must be consistent with both Chiappori￿ s (1992) model and
Chiappori￿ s (1997) model. As a point of departure, we consider a linear speci￿cation
for the domestic labor supply functions,
t
1 = A0(d) + A1w1 + A2w2 + u1; (3)
t
2 = B0(d) + B1w2 + B2w1 + u2; (4)
where A0(d);B0(d) are linear functions of the socio-demographic factors, A1;:::;B2
are parameters and u1 and u2 are stochastic terms. For the market labor supply
functions, we consider a quadratic speci￿cation,
h




2 + a5w1w2 + a6y + u3; (5)
h




2 + b5w1w2 + b6y + u4; (6)
where a0(d);b0(d) are linear functions of the socio-demographic factors, a1;:::;b6
are parameters and u3 and u4 are stochastic terms. This speci￿cation is su¢ ciently
￿ exible for the present purpose.8 For the sake of our discussion, we suppose that
stochastic terms represent unobservable heterogeneity in preferences, in the sharing
rule and in the pro￿t function. In the empirical application, stochastic terms will
also represent optimization and measurement errors.
In what follows, we will consider two cases, whether the econometrician accounts for
domestic production or not, and two di⁄erent structural models. In the former case,
7The discussion here is inspired by Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2010).
8For the reduced-form domestic labor supply functions, a quadratic speci￿cation is not com-
patible with the quadratic speci￿cation of the reduced-form market labor supply functions.
12the system of four equations (3)￿ (6) is estimated and the sharing rule is identi￿ed
using all the information about spouses￿market and domestic labor behavior. In the
latter case, the system of only two equations (5)￿ (6) is estimated. The uniqueness of
the parameters of the sharing rule (except for some functions of socio-demographic
factors) is then guaranteed from propositions 2 and 4. In other words the structural
parameters of the sharing rule are de￿ned as a combination of the parameters of the
reduced form of labor supply equations.
3.2 Structural-Form Model 1: Chiappori￿ s (1992) Model
If there is no domestic production, we can show that the unique speci￿cation for the
husband￿ s share of income compatible with (5)￿ (6) is given by
￿




2 + ￿5w1w2 + ￿6y;
and for the wife￿ s share of income by
￿
2(w1;w2;y;d) = y ￿ ￿
1(w1;w2;y);
where ￿0(d) is some unidenti￿ed (possibly stochastic) function while9
￿1 = a5b1=(a6b5 ￿ a5b6); (7a)
￿2 = a2b5=(a6b5 ￿ a5b6); (7b)
￿3 = a5b3=(a6b5 ￿ a5b6); (7c)
￿4 = a4b5=(a6b5 ￿ a5b6); (7d)
￿5 = a5b5=(a6b5 ￿ a5b6); (7e)
￿6 = a6b5=(a6b5 ￿ a5b6); (7f)
provided that a6b5 6= a5b6 (a regularity condition). In addition, the structural form
of the spouses￿total labor supply functions are given by
L









9We do not explicitly derive the structural parameters here, which would be fastidious. The
reader can easily check that incorporating (7) and (10) in (8) and (9) gives (5) and (6). Of course,
the same remark applies for the other model.
13where, as previously, ￿0(d) and ￿0(d) are some unidenti￿ed functions,
￿0(d) = a0(d) + u3 ￿ (a6 ￿ a5b6=b5)￿0(d); (10a)
￿0(d) = b0(d) + u4 + (b6 ￿ b5a6=a5)￿0(d); (10b)
while
￿1 = a1 ￿ a5b1=b5; (10c)
￿1 = b2 ￿ b5a2=a5; (10d)
￿2 = a3 ￿ a5b3=b5; (10e)
￿2 = b4 ￿ b5a4=a5; (10f)
￿3 = a6 ￿ a5b6=b5; (10g)
￿3 = b6 ￿ b5a6=a5: (10h)
Once ￿0(d) is ￿xed to some value (e.g., it is identically equal to zero), the values
of ￿0(d) and ￿0(d) are uniquely de￿ned. Note that the structural model does not
generate over-identifying restrictions. Nevertheless, the model can be empirically
tested because of the Slutsky Positivity condition that must be satis￿ed by labor
supply functions. This condition is globally satis￿ed if ￿1;￿1 > 0, ￿2;￿2 > 0 and
￿2;￿3 < 0. The normality of leisure can also be tested separately.
The structural model of market labor supply is ￿ exible in the sense that it is consis-
tent with both forward and backward bending supply curves. In addition, the utility
functions that are behind these market labor supply functions have a closed form
which is formally derived by Hausman and Ruud (1986) and Kapteyn, Kooreman,
and van Soest (1990). Instead of presenting these functions that are rather intricate,
we would like to underline that, using the Roy￿ s identity, the e⁄ect of wage rates
and non-labor income on husband￿ s utility can be written as:
￿U1 = ￿1 ￿ (L1 + ￿1 + 2￿3w1 + ￿5w2) ￿ ￿w1; (11a)
￿U1 = ￿1 ￿ (￿2 + 2￿4w2 + ￿5w1) ￿ ￿w2; (11b)
￿U1 = ￿1 ￿ ￿6 ￿ ￿y; (11c)
where ￿1 is an arbitrary scalar representing the marginal utility of money for the
husband (Donni, 2008). Therefore, the knowledge of shares of income allows carrying
out welfare analysis at the individual level. Needless to say, similar expressions could
be derived for the wife￿ s utility.
143.3 Structural-Form Model 2: Chiappori￿ s (1997) Model
If there is domestic production, we can show, as a consequence of Hotelling lemma,




















0(d) is some unidenti￿ed function while
￿
￿
1 = ￿A0(d) ￿ u1; (12a)
￿
￿
2 = ￿B0(d) ￿ u2; (12b)
￿
￿
3 = ￿A1=2; (12c)
￿
￿
4 = ￿B1=2; (12d)
￿
￿
5 = ￿A2 = ￿B2 = ￿C; (12e)
where the last equality is a testable restriction. This pro￿t function is locally regular
(that is, increasing and convex in the prices of production factors) if ￿￿






2 > 0 and if its derivatives with respect to wage rates w1 and w2 are
non-positive. However, the regularity domain will be very large if domestic working
time is insensitive to changes in wage rates. As we shall see, this is the case in our
empirical application.






















and for the wife￿ s share of income by
￿
2(w1;w2;y;d) = y + ￿(w1;w2;d) ￿ ￿
1(w1;w2;y;d):
15where ￿￿
































































These relations put the emphasis on the di⁄erences between the parameters of the
sharing rule derived from the two structural models. In particular, let us note that,
if C = 0, that is, if the cross-e⁄ect of wage rates on domestic labor supply is equal to
zero, the e⁄ect of non-labor income and the cross-e⁄ect of wage rates on individual
shares are the same in both models (that is, only the own-e⁄ect of wage rates on































0(d) are some unidenti￿ed functions,
￿
￿





0(d) + (A0(d) + u1); (16a)
￿
￿











1 = a1 ￿
a5b6 ￿ a6b5
b5 + Cb6
(A0(d) + u1) ￿
a5 + Ca6
b5 + Cb6
(b1 + C) + A1; (16c)
￿
￿
1 = b2 +
a5b6 ￿ a6b5
a5 + Ca6
(B0(d) + u2) ￿
b5 + Cb6
a5 + Ca6
(a2 + C) + B1; (16d)
￿
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Similarly to what is obtained for the previous structural-form, the marginal e⁄ect





























6 ￿ ￿y: (17c)
Substituting the values obtained for ￿￿
1;:::,￿￿





























In words, both structural models give the same measurement of welfare variations
provided that the cross-wage term of domestic labor supply equations is equal to
zero. A similar conclusion is drawn by Donni (2008) and Donni and Moreau (2007)
in a collective model with distribution factors (the latter authors also present the
intuition behind this result).
174 Data and Estimation Method
4.1 Data
The data used in this work are the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for the
year 2003 to 2006. The data collection was sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The ATUS sample
is chosen from the households that completed their eighth (￿nal) interview for the
Current Population Survey (CPS), the U.S. labor force survey, and was designed to
provide nationally representative estimates of time that Americans spend in various
activities. The ATUS collects data about daily activities from all segments of the
population of age 15 and over, including persons who are employed, unemployed,
or not in the labor force (such as students or retirees), for both weekdays and
weekends. Since the ATUS uses the CPS as a sampling frame, it also contains the
same demographic information as the CPS.
Our initial sample includes 116,223 households. We selected a subsample of married
couples without children. The presence of children, indeed, is not consistent with our
theoretical model.10 We also restrict the sample to couples in which both members
have a job and are between 25 and 60 years old. This selection, the exclusion of
missing or incomplete information and the merge with other data set leave us a
sample of 4443 households.
In the ATUS-CPS data set, we have information on the labor market state of both
household members, such as hours worked per week and weekly earning. Conse-
quently, market wage is determined as the ratio between weekly labor income and
hours worked per week. In Table 1, descriptive statistics of the sample are reported.
We note that mean weekly working hours for male are about 44, whereas they are
39 for females. The male hourly wage is about $21 per hour, whereas the wage
rate of females is about $17 per hour. As regards household production, the de￿ni-
tion of domestic work includes household activities like housework (interior cleaning,
laundry, etc.), food and drink preparation, and interior and exterior maintenance.
Because the ATUS collects information on household activities for only one member
in the family, we know domestic labor supply for only 1413 women and 1230 men.
For 1800 households we do not know domestic labor supply neither for the husband
10The selection of childless couples is usual in estimation of collective models (Fortin and Lacroix,
1997, and Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir, 2007, for instance)
18nor for the wife. In Table 1, our data reveals that mean weekly domestic working
time for male is about 7 hours, whereas it is 13 hours for working women. Finally,
for each household member we know the age, the level of schooling (expressed in
years), the ethnicity (dummy variable: Hispanic or not), and the race (dummy vari-
able: non-white or white). We also use information regarding the region of residence
(dummy variables: Midwest, South, West; reference is Northeast), and the housing
tenure (dummy variable: owned or not).
The availability of information on the annual family net expenditure was obtained
by the imputation of this value from the Current Expenditure Survey (CES), for
the year 2003 to the ￿rst quarter of 2006. We selected a subsample of 683 married,
childless couples in which both members have a job. The variables used for the
19imputation of net expenditure include a second order polynomial in husband￿ s age
and education, the dummy variables for husband￿ s race and ethnicity, a second order
polynomial in wife￿ s age and education, the dummy variables for wife￿ s race and
ethnicity, the three dummy variables for the region of residence, the dummy variable
for housing tenure, the unemployment rate by state and by year, household non labor
income (rent, social security, public assistance, alimony, interest and dividends, cash
scholarships, fellowships, etc.). The last three variables are excluded from labor
supply equations and are used for identi￿cation.
4.2 Estimation Method
In what follows, we consider the estimation of the complete system, (3)￿ (6), of
reduced-form market and domestic labor supply equations.11 The households are
indexed by i = 1;2;:::;N where N is the total number of observations. The obser-
vations do not contain complete information on spouses￿time allocation. Indeed, as
explained in section 4.1, only one person in the family (at most) is questioned about
her/his domestic time use. Hence, out of the N observations we use in this study, we
have N1 < N observations for which male domestic labor time is reported but not
female domestic labor time, N2 < N observations for which female domestic labor
time is reported and not male labor time, and N3 < N observations with only mar-
ket labor time. Furthermore, given that we concentrate our analysis of labor supply
upon the subsample of households in the workforce, we face a sample selection prob-
lem. The problem surfaces primarily for women, given that the participation rate
of married woman is about 63%. Thus, we use the Heckit method (Heckman, 1976)
to correct for the sample selection bias generated by the exclusion of nonworking
women. Let us represent compactly the system of reduced-form market and domes-




ij￿j + ￿j￿i + uij with j = 1;2;3;4;
where yij represents the explained variable j for observation i, that is, the time
devoted to market or domestic activities by the husband or the wife, y1 = t1, y2 = t2,
y3 = h1, and y4 = h2, xij is the vector of explanatory variables, ￿i the inverse Mill￿ s
11The system (5)￿ (6) can be seen as a particular case of the complete system and its estimation
is not discussed here.
20ratio, and ￿j and ￿j the corresponding vector of parameters. For the domestic
labor supply equations, the vector of explanatory variables xij includes, in addition
to wage rates, the age and the squared age of the corresponding person, the dummy
variable for her/his race and her/his ethnicity, the three dummy variables for the
region of residence and a dummy for weekend days. For the market labor supply
equations, the vector of explanatory variables xij includes, in addition to wage rates
and net expenditure, the same variables as for the domestic labor supply functions
except the dummy for weekend days. As is explained below, education is used as
an instrument for wage rates and is excluded from labor supply equations; it is
incorporated in these equations only when wage rates are not instrumented.12
The stochastic terms on the right-hand side of these equations are supposed to be
homoskedastic, uncorrelated across households but correlated across the di⁄erent
time uses within households. Hence the system of reduced-form equations is seem-
ingly unrelated according to Zellner￿ s terminology. Furthermore, we have reasons to
believe that wage rates are endogenous (because of the way of constructing them, in
particular (Borjas, 1980)). The reduced-form equations are thus estimated alterna-
tively by the SUR (Zellner, 1962) and the 3SLS (Zellner and Theil, 1962) methods,
the latter method is to account for the probable endogeneity of wage rates. In the
discussion that follows we focus on the description of the 3SLS method; the SUR
method is simply a particular case.
In the ￿rst stage of the estimation process, a selection equation for women￿ s labor
force participation is estimated using a Probit model and, from these estimates, the
Inverse Mill￿ s ratio ^ ￿i is computed. Explanatory variables include here a second
order polynomial in husband￿ s age and education, a product between husband￿ s age
and education, the dummy variables for husband￿ s race and ethnicity, a second order
polynomial in wife￿ s age and education, a product between wife￿ s age and education,
the dummy variable for wife￿ s race and ethnicity, the three dummy variables for the
region of residence, the unemployment rate by state and by year, and household
net expenditure as de￿ned in section 4.1. Then the wage rates, the squared wage
rates and the cross product of wage rates that enter market labor supply equations
are regressed on the same variables (except net expenditure) and the Inverse Mill￿ s
ratio. The vector of explanatory variables xij with the ￿tted values obtained from
12For other studies that use education as an excluded instrument, see Bourguignon and Magnac
(1990) or Pencavel (1998).
21this preliminary stage instead of the current variables is denoted by ^ xij.
In the second stage of the estimation process, the yij￿ s are regressed on ^ xij using the
OLS method to obtain estimates ^ ￿j and then compute
^ !jk =
P
i2Njk ^ uij^ uik
#Njk
for j;k = 1;:::;4;
where ^ uij is the residual calculated using OLS estimates, namely,
^ uij = yij ￿ x
0
ij^ ￿j ￿ ^ ￿j^ ￿ij;
and Njk is the set of indexes i such that variables j and k are both observed.13 With
the usual staking of observations, each reduced-form equation can be written as:
yj = ^ Xj￿j + ￿j^ ￿j + uj;
where yj is the vector of explained variables, ^ Xj is is the matrix of ￿tted explanatory
variables, ^ ￿j is the vector of inverse of Mill￿ s ratio, and uj is the vector of stochastic
terms. In matrix notation, if there is no constraint on the parameters (that is, the
symmetry of domestic labor supply equations is not imposed) so that the matrix ^ Z


















^ Z1 0 0 0
0 ^ Z2 0 0
0 0 ^ Z3 0


























y = ^ Z￿ + u
where ^ Zj = [^ Xj





. . . ￿j]. The estimated covariance matrix of the
13The operator # is the number of elements of the set. Precisely, #Njk = N1 if j or k = 1, j and
k 6= 2, #Njk = N2 if j or k = 2, j and k 6= 1, #Njk = N1 + N2 + N3 = N if j or k = 3 or 4 (and
#Njk = 0 if j or k = 1 or 2 and j 6= k so that ^ !12 cannot be computed). Note that there exist
various techniques to compute the matrix of variance in SUR estimations with unequal number of
observations. See Schmidt (1977), Baltagi, Garvin, and Kerman (1989), and Hwang and Schulman
(1996). Overall, the gain in e¢ ciency are not important in using a more sophisticated technique.
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^ !11IN1 0 ^ !13IN1 0 0 ^ !14IN1 0 0
0 ^ !22IN2 0 ^ !23IN2 0 0 ^ !24IN2 0
^ !31IN1 0 ^ !33IN1 0 0 ^ !34IN1 0 0
0 ^ !32IN2 0 ^ !33IN2 0 0 ^ !34IN2 0
0 0 0 0 ^ !33IN3 0 0 ^ !34IN3
^ !41IN1 0 ^ !43IN1 0 0 ^ !44IN1 0 0
0 ^ !42IN2 0 ^ !43IN2 0 0 ^ !44IN2 0
0 0 0 0 ^ !43IN3 0 0 ^ !44IN3
1
C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C
A
;
which is independent of ^ !12. The 3SLS estimator is given by






The estimation procedure is the same when the constraint of symmetry is imposed
except that the matrix ^ Z is not block diagonal. The SUR estimator is obtained
by replacing ^ xij by xij in the 3SLS procedure. One ￿nal remark concerns the
selection issue. In principle, identi￿cation is based on the existence of at least one
variable which appears with a non-zero coe¢ cient in the selection equation but does
not appear in the equation of interest. If the decision of not working is voluntary
(i.e., resulting from the maximization of a utility function), then these variables
generally do not exist. The alternative possibility is to pose a speci￿c assumption
on the distribution of the random terms u. For instance, the distribution may be
supposed to be normal or, more generally, to be symmetric (Powell, 1986). We do
not exploit excluded instruments and thus use one of these assumptions to identify
the parameters in presence of the selection issue. Because of the fragility of these
assumptions, however, we also estimate the model imposing ￿j = 0 for j = 1;:::;4:
5 Estimation Results and Discussion
5.1 The reduced-form models
The estimation results for the reduced-form labor supply equations, (3)-(6), ob-
tained by the 3SLS method (accounting for sample selection) are presented in Ta-
ble 2. The estimated parameters and their standard deviations are reported for the
two-equation system and the four-equation system. Like it can be easily seen, the
23estimation results whatever the model we consider are very similar, which is not re-
ally surprising as the parametric speci￿cations of the market labor supply equations
in both cases are the same. Only the estimation methods are di⁄erent.14
The main results can be summarized as follows. For the market labor supply equa-
tions, and whatever the model we consider, net expenditure has a negative, which
was expected, but not signi￿cant impact for both the husband and the wife. Overall,
the parameters concerning wage rates as well as socio-demographic variables are not
precisely estimated. Considering the collective model with domestic production for
instance, the marginal e⁄ect of the wife￿ s (husband￿ s) wage rate on her (his) market
time computed at the average point of the sample (not reported in the table) is equal
to 0:453 (￿0:101) with a standard deviation of 0:353 (1:240).15 For the domestic
labor supply equations, it appears that the standard deviations of the estimates are
excessively large too. On the whole, it seems that instruments are not su¢ ciently
strong to provide precise estimations of the parameters. Therefore we will turn to
the estimations obtained by the SUR method which are exhibited on Table 3.
First of all, note that the estimates are quite di⁄erent from, and more signi￿cant
than, those obtained by the 3SLS method.16 Regarding the market labor supply
equations, net expenditure has now a signi￿cant impact for the husband. The pa-
rameters related to wage rates are quite precisely estimated, especially in the wife￿ s
equations where most of them are signi￿cant. Using the model with domestic pro-
duction, the marginal e⁄ect of the wife￿ s (husband￿ s) wage rate on her (his) market
time, computed at the average point of the sample, is equal to 0:153 (￿0:040) with a
standard deviation of 0:023 (0:017), while the direct elasticity of wife￿ s (husband￿ s)
market labor supply is thus equal to 0:066 (￿0:019). The estimates are actually
conformed to what is generally obtained in the empirical literature based on U.S.
14Technically, empirical results for reduced-form market labor supply equations would be the
same if ^ !13 = ^ !14 = ^ !23 = ^ !24 = 0.
15The standard errors of the marginal e⁄ects at stake here (and of the structural parameters
computed below) are calculated using the Delta method. That is, given the marginal e⁄ects ￿ (say)
expressed as a function of the reduced-form parameters ￿ (say), namely, ￿ = f(￿), we calculate the
covariance matrix V￿ of the marginal e⁄ects using: V￿ = (@f=@￿)
0
V￿(@f=@￿), where V￿ is the
covariance matrix of the reduced-form parameters.
16Explanatory variables in SUR estimations include education because this variable has not to
be used as an instrument for wage rates. Note that education has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on market
labor supply, which seems to invalidate it as an instrument.
24252627data (Devereux, 2003, 2004; Pencavel, 1998, 2002, 2006, for instance). In particu-
lar, the fact that an increase in the husband￿ s wage rate has a negative impact on
his market hours, is not uncommon.17 Regarding socio-demographic variables, note
that the non-white and Hispanic dummies have a negative e⁄ect for men.
For the domestic labor supply equations, an increase in wife￿ s wage rate has a
negative, signi￿cant impact on her domestic hours, while an increase in husband￿ s
wage rate has virtually no impact on his domestic hours. The direct elasticity of
wife￿ s domestic labor supply, computed at the average point of the sample, is equal to
￿0:112. The cross e⁄ect of spouses￿wage rate is positive, and signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero, indicating that time inputs are substitute in the production process. The
hypothesis of a (very moderate) substitutability between time inputs is supported by
several empirical studies with U.S. data (Gronau, 1977, 1980; Graham and Green,
1984). The Hispanic and non-white dummies are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero, but education is negative and signi￿cant for wives. The weekend days dummy
is positive and large. In other words, spouses devote more time to household chores
during weekend.
To obtain more precise results, we also consider the estimated parameters obtained
by the SUR method without accounting for sample selection on Table 4. In gen-
eral, standard deviations are moderately smaller, in particular for socio-demographic
variables, but the results are not altered by the omission of the inverse of Mill￿ s ratio
from labor supply equations.
The main conclusion we can draw from the reduced-form estimations is that in-
struments are not su¢ ciently strong to provide precise estimations of the parame-
ters. In what follows, we will focus on the estimates obtained by the SUR method
(accounting for sample selection) which are a little more signi￿cant. In addition,
the estimations given by this method are much more convincing in view of the past
literature. However we must keep in mind the possible bias that may result from
the endogeneity of wages rates.
Finally, for all the models, we tested the restriction (13e), namely the constraint of
symmetry in spouses￿domestic labor supplies. First the reduced-form labor supply
equations, (3)-(6), has been estimated without imposing the constraint A2 = B2
17The interpretation according to which income e⁄ects dominates substitution e⁄ects is not valid
here since the theoretical model is collective.
28and, then, the test statistic has been computed as
t =
A2 ￿ B2 p
var(A2) + var(B2) ￿ 2cov(A2;B2)
This statistic is asymptotically distributed as a standardized normal. For the SUR
estimation taking into account selection, its value is equal to ￿0:357, then we do
not reject the hypothesis of symmetry at usual levels. Moreover, data con￿rms that
domestic labor supplies are independent from non labor income, as the theoretical
model says. The reduced-form labor supply equations, (3)-(6), in fact, has been
estimated including net expenditure as explanatory variable also in domestic labor
supplies. Net expenditure is never signi￿cant, for both the husband and the wife,
in domestic labor supply equations. The corresponding t￿ratios are equal to 0:748
and ￿0:861 for the husband￿ s and the wife￿ s equations, respectively.
5.2 The structural-form models
In this subsection we turn to the estimates of the structural parameters, obtained
with the SUR method. These results are reported in Table 5 and are derived using
the formulae previously given. Concerning the Marshallian labor supply equations,
the estimates of Chiappori￿ s (1992) model and those of Chiappori￿ s (1997) model
are of the same sign and the same order of magnitude. This is expected because the
cross-wage terms in the domestic labor supply equations are small.
Whatever the model we consider, an increase in husband￿ s wage rate has virtually
no impact on his market hours while the wife￿ s labor supply is clearly backward
bending, with a cusp point at a relatively large level of wage rate (around ￿fty
dollars). These results are conformed to intuition and to some empirical estimates
obtained with the unitary approach (see the discussion above). Moreover, the slope
of Engel curves is negative for both the husband and the wife. This represents an
interesting test of the collective approach. If it is admitted because uncontroversial
that leisure is a normal good, then the parameters ￿3 (or ￿￿
3) and ￿3 (or ￿
￿
3) must
be negative. As previously seen, the negativity of these parameters is guaranteed if
the right-hand side of expressions (10g) (or (16g)) and (10h) (or (16h)) is negative,
which is far from being trivial properties.
For the estimates of the parameters of the husband￿ s income share, and whatever the
model we consider, net expenditure has a positive, greater than half, and signi￿cant
29e⁄ect on the fraction of total income received by the husband. This result is in line
with previous studies by Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2007), Bloemen
(2010), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), and Donni (2007) that ignore domestic
production. Overall, this empirical observation seems to be remarkably robust across
studies.18 Be that as it may, the other parameters of the husband￿ s income share are
less precisely estimated and di⁄er moderately for the two models we examine. For
the model without domestic production, and computed at the average point of the
sample, the marginal e⁄ect of a one-dollar increase in the husband￿ s wage rate and
wife￿ s wage rate reduces the husband￿ s income share by about ￿fteen dollars and
twelve dollars, respectively. Such a reduction in the husband￿ s share is plausible,
as explained by Donni (2007), because the wife should bene￿t from the increase in
husband￿ s wage rate as well. Note indeed that an increase in the husband￿ s wage
rate implies an increase of the husband￿ s welfare by thirty-seven units.
Overall, the results are similar for the model with domestic production. Nonetheless,
the negative e⁄ect of the wife￿ s wage rate on the husband￿ s share (or the husband￿ s
welfare) is much more marked than in the model without domestic production. To
be precise, the marginal e⁄ect of a one-dollar increase in the wife￿ s wage rate reduces
the husband￿ s income share by about seventy four dollars, which is considerable. One
explanation is that the collective model without domestic production ignores the fact
that wage rates have also an indirect e⁄ect on husband￿ s leisure through variations
in domestic activities. Since spouses￿time inputs are substitute in the household
technology, the decline in husband￿ s leisure, and in his utility, due to an increase in
wife￿ s wage rate is thus underestimated. On the contrary, in the collective model
with domestic production, the welfare of husbands turns out to be more largely
a⁄ected, as indicated by the marginal e⁄ects exhibited in Table 5, by the increase
in wife￿ s wage rate. Nevertheless, the standard deviations are excessively large so
that it is not possible to draw de￿nitive conclusions.
To sum up we can say that welfare measurement does not seem importantly af-
fected by the omission of domestic activities in the collective model. The estimates
of the parameters of the sharing rule are admittedly di⁄erent for the two mod-
els, but standard deviations are large and these di⁄erences does not appear to be
18All the studies mentioned above suppose that net expediture has a linear e⁄ect on market
labor supply. Other studies by Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Donni et Moreau (2007) do not
furnish precise estimation of the structural parameters.
30signi￿cant. Similarly, estimations of the e⁄ect of wage rates and net expenditure
on individual utilities are not very sensitive to the choice of the structural model
(only the cross-e⁄ect of wage rates di⁄ers notably, but standard deviations remain
large). Our conclusion contrasts with that of Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2010), who
show that ignoring domestic production leads to biased estimates of the sharing rule.
Actually, the sensitivity of domestic hours to wage rates plays a major role when
examining distortions due to the omission of domestic activities. It is clear that
in our data (and in many other data on time use) domestic labor supply is rather
inelastic, so that distortions remain limited. Because the study of Rapoport, Sofer
31and Solaz (2010) uses a di⁄erent methodology and does not explicitly estimate do-
mestic labor supply equations, it is di¢ cult to continue the comparison, and explain
the di⁄erences between these studies.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we focused on the collective model of labor supply introducing house-
hold production. One of our aims was to examine whether home production does
matter or not. We demonstrate a new identi￿cation result and show, in fact, that in-
corporating domestic production does not modify radically the conclusions that can
be derived from the traditional collective model of labor supply (Chiappori, 1992).
This conclusion, however, must be balanced by the fact that the parameters are not
estimated with a great precision (at least when wage rates are instrumented).
To improve the precision of the estimates, next developments of this work should
explicitly consider corner solutions in the collective model with household production
and model the decision to participate in the labor market. For the case of market
behavior, identi￿cation results have previously been generalized. Because spouses￿
wage rates (if observed) are not equal to marginal productivities, domestic labor
supply must be expressed as a function of shadow wage rates that represent the price
of leisure. Such an extension is necessary to increase the number of observations as
well as the dispersion in market working time. This is the objective of future work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
To begin with, we de￿ne total individual labor supply functions in this context of






2(w2;y + ￿(w1;w2;d) ￿ ￿(w1;w2;y;d);d):
32where ￿ = ￿1 and y+￿￿￿ = ￿2. Then we calculate the derivatives of total labor





















￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿y):
where the term @￿=@w1 = ￿t1(w1;w2) from Hotelling￿ s lemma. Taking the same



















where the left-hand side is observable by the econometrician. Then, di⁄erentiating
these expressions, we obtain
￿w2w1 = Aw1￿y + A￿yw1;
￿w2y = Ay￿y + A￿yy;
￿w1w2 = ￿t
1
w2 ￿ Bw2(1 ￿ ￿y) + B￿yw2;
￿w1y = ￿t
1
y ￿ By(1 ￿ ￿y) + B￿yy:
which constitutes with (A-1) and (A-2) a system of six equations and seven un-
knowns. In spite of the fact that the number of unknowns is greater than the
number of equations, this system can be solved with respect to the derivatives of
the sharing rule, that is,
￿y =
ABy ￿ Bw2 ￿ t1
w2
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